



## Cambridge Pre-U

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**PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY**

**9774/01**

Paper 1 Introduction to Philosophy and Theology

**October/November 2020**

MARK SCHEME

Maximum Mark: 75

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**Published**

This mark scheme is published as an aid to teachers and candidates, to indicate the requirements of the examination. It shows the basis on which Examiners were instructed to award marks. It does not indicate the details of the discussions that took place at an Examiners' meeting before marking began, which would have considered the acceptability of alternative answers.

Mark schemes should be read in conjunction with the question paper and the Principal Examiner Report for Teachers.

Cambridge International will not enter into discussions about these mark schemes.

Cambridge International is publishing the mark schemes for the October/November 2020 series for most Cambridge IGCSE™, Cambridge International A and AS Level and Cambridge Pre-U components, and some Cambridge O Level components.

**Generic Marking Principles**

These general marking principles must be applied by all examiners when marking candidate answers. They should be applied alongside the specific content of the mark scheme or generic level descriptors for a question. Each question paper and mark scheme will also comply with these marking principles.

**GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 1:**

Marks must be awarded in line with:

- the specific content of the mark scheme or the generic level descriptors for the question
- the specific skills defined in the mark scheme or in the generic level descriptors for the question
- the standard of response required by a candidate as exemplified by the standardisation scripts.

**GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 2:**

Marks awarded are always **whole marks** (not half marks, or other fractions).

**GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 3:**

Marks must be awarded **positively**:

- marks are awarded for correct/valid answers, as defined in the mark scheme. However, credit is given for valid answers which go beyond the scope of the syllabus and mark scheme, referring to your Team Leader as appropriate
- marks are awarded when candidates clearly demonstrate what they know and can do
- marks are not deducted for errors
- marks are not deducted for omissions
- answers should only be judged on the quality of spelling, punctuation and grammar when these features are specifically assessed by the question as indicated by the mark scheme. The meaning, however, should be unambiguous.

**GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 4:**

Rules must be applied consistently, e.g. in situations where candidates have not followed instructions or in the application of generic level descriptors.

**GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 5:**

Marks should be awarded using the full range of marks defined in the mark scheme for the question (however; the use of the full mark range may be limited according to the quality of the candidate responses seen).

**GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 6:**

Marks awarded are based solely on the requirements as defined in the mark scheme. Marks should not be awarded with grade thresholds or grade descriptors in mind.

**Assessment objectives (AOs)**

AO1	Demonstrate knowledge and understanding; identify, select and apply ideas and concepts through the use of examples and evidence.	40%
AO2	Provide a systematic critical analysis of the texts and theories, sustain a line of argument and justify a point of view. Different views should be referred to and evaluated where appropriate. Demonstrate a synoptic approach to the areas studied.	60%

AO1 and AO2 are both to be considered in assessing each essay.

The **Generic Marking Scheme** should be used to decide the mark. The essay should first be placed within a level which best describes its qualities, and then at a specific point within that level to determine a mark out of 25.

The **Question-Specific Notes** provide guidance for Examiners as to the area covered by the question. These question-specific notes are not exhaustive. Candidates may answer the question from a variety of angles with different emphases and using different supporting evidence and knowledge for which they receive credit according to the Generic Marking Scheme levels. However, candidates must clearly answer the question as set and not their own question. Examiners are reminded that the insights of specific religious traditions are, of course, relevant, and it is likely that candidates will draw on the views of Jewish, Christian or Islamic theologians, as well as those of philosophers who have written about the concept of God from a purely philosophical standpoint. There is nothing to prevent candidates referring to other religious traditions and these must, of course, be credited appropriately in examination responses.

**Generic Marking Scheme**

Level 5 21–25 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Broad knowledge and understanding of a wide range of philosophical/religious issues.</li> <li>• Insightful selection and application of ideas and concepts.</li> <li>• Excellent critical engagement and detailed evaluation of the wider implications of the question.</li> <li>• Complete or near complete accuracy at this level.</li> <li>• Argument is coherent, structured, developed and convincingly sustained.</li> <li>• Employs a wide range of differing points of view and supporting evidence.</li> <li>• Good evidence of wide reading on the topic beyond the set texts.</li> <li>• Shows good understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate.</li> <li>• Confident and precise use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.</li> </ul>
Level 4 16–20 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Knowledge is accurate and a good range of philosophical/religious issues are considered.</li> <li>• Systematic/good selection and application of ideas and concepts.</li> <li>• Good critical engagement and evaluation of the implications of the question.</li> <li>• Response is accurate: the question is answered specifically.</li> <li>• Argument has structure and development and is sustained.</li> <li>• Good use of differing points of view and supporting evidence.</li> <li>• Some evidence of reading on the topic beyond the set texts.</li> <li>• Shows competent understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate.</li> <li>• Accurate use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.</li> </ul>
Level 3 12–15 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Knowledge is generally accurate and a fair range of issues are considered.</li> <li>• Reasonable selection and application of ideas and concepts.</li> <li>• Some critical engagement and evaluation of the question.</li> <li>• Response is largely relevant to the question asked.</li> <li>• Argument has some structure and shows some development, but may not be sustained.</li> <li>• Considers more than one point of view and uses evidence to support argument.</li> <li>• May show some understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate.</li> <li>• Reasonable attempt to use philosophical and theological vocabulary accurately.</li> </ul>
Level 2 8–11 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Some accuracy of knowledge. More than one issue is touched upon.</li> <li>• Attempts to select and apply ideas with partial success.</li> <li>• Attempts to evaluate though with partial success.</li> <li>• Response is partially relevant to the question asked but may be one-sided.</li> <li>• Some attempt at argument but without development and coherence.</li> <li>• Some attempt to use supporting evidence.</li> <li>• Philosophical and theological vocabulary is occasionally used correctly.</li> </ul>
Level 1 1–7 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Some key points made. Possibly repetitive or short.</li> <li>• Explores some isolated ideas related to the general topic.</li> <li>• Argument is limited or confused.</li> <li>• Response is limited or tenuously linked to the question.</li> <li>• Limited attempt to use evidence.</li> <li>• Philosophical and theological vocabulary is inaccurate or absent.</li> </ul>
Level 0 0 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No relevant material to credit.</li> </ul>

Question	Answer	Marks
1	<p><b>Critically examine Plato’s analogies of the Divided Line and the Cave.</b></p> <p>The analogies of the Divided Line and the Cave illustrate Plato’s view that the world of sense experience produces nothing beyond ‘opinion’. Knowledge can be obtained by comprehending the Forms.</p> <p>The analogy of the Divided Line asks us to envisage a line divided into two unequal parts, followed by a further sub-division in the same ratio. One side of the line features the epistemic states of illusion, belief, mathematical reasoning and intelligence, corresponding to shadows/reflections/illusions, physical objects, mathematical forms and the Forms as objects of comprehension by the mind. These are hierarchical, so illusions and beliefs (based on sense experience of the physical objects) give us what Plato calls ‘opinion’, whereas mathematical reasoning and intelligence together give us knowledge. Analysis might focus on any aspect of these stages of knowledge: for example the oddity in Plato’s view that dialectical reasoning can grasp concepts such as justice and beauty in abstraction from just actions and beautiful things. Equally, where for Plato moral good can be known, many would deny the existence of moral absolutes. Plato is clearly arguing for a rationalist (over an empiricist) account of knowledge, which might be attractive to some. Some might question the proportions of the divisions of the line.</p> <p>In the analogy of the Cave, ordinary citizens are pictured as chained prisoners, condemned through habit and by intellectual limitation to see the shadows of objects, and to believe that the shadows are the real objects themselves. If a prisoner were to be released, long habit would lead him to assume that the objects he now saw were less real than the shadows they cast. Nevertheless, in his ascent to the outside world, he would eventually be able to look at the objects themselves, and ultimately at the light of the Sun (the Form of the Good). The different stages of the journey can be matched to the different epistemic stages in the analogy of the Divided Line. The analogy of the Cave might be seen as a political device to justify the rule of philosophers as those who alone are intellectually capable of reasoning their way to the Forms. This makes sense to the extent that those who possess this capability are fit to rule, since they are not blinded by the senses and possess the ability to improve the lot of ‘ordinary’ people. Some might retort that philosophers are not notorious for common sense, and where rationalists ground reality in unobservable entities, common sense supports the value of sense experience, not least through the successes of empirical science and its current hold on culture. Analysis of the rationalist/empiricist divide is likely, but should relate to issues raised by the analogies of the Divided Line and the Cave.</p> <p>Accept all relevant approaches to the question, and mark solely in accordance with the generic Levels of Response.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
2	<p><b>Assess the claim that moral relativism is unreasonable.</b></p> <p>Moral relativism generally holds that moral statements relate to nothing factual or objective, but relate instead to cultural, social, historical and other circumstances. On the face of it, moral relativism is hardly unreasonable, since there appears to be a great deal of evidence to support its claims. Historically, theistic religious morality has held to moral absolutism on the grounds that an omniscient and omnibenevolent God must be the source of absolute values that relate to her wholly good character; but this view requires the existence of such a being, which cannot be demonstrated; moreover there is disagreement as to what the supposedly absolute rules are, as we see in the case of Divine Command Theory. Equally, cultural moral values vary significantly, not least in sexual ethics. Moral values are also subjective – they relate to personal circumstances (such as upbringing) and personal convictions: for example, some may have an absolute conviction that capital punishment is a form of unjustified murder, whereas others will see it as a justified retribution and retaliation. Hume in particular distinguished between matters of fact and matters of value, concluding that moral judgements do not deal with verifiable facts in the world. Ethical non-cognitivism holds that moral values reduce, for example, to matters of emotion and/or prescription. Weight of argument might therefore judge that moral relativism is reasonable, and that moral disagreements are inevitable.</p> <p>There are a number of problems which candidates might raise in opposition to this. Some might hold that moral relativism has a logical contradiction at its core, since the view that all morality is relative is an absolute. Some might regard this objection as trite, but there are others of serious weight. For example, moral absolutism is not so easy to dismiss: many relate post-war decadence to the decline of moral values (often citing Nietzsche as the ringleader) through embracing the ‘easy option’ of doing what we like. If there are no moral absolutes, then no individual can claim any strong grounds for objecting to the actions of another whose moral viewpoint accepts indiscriminate killing, including killing the individual concerned. Some will point to the emergence of generally accepted absolutes (e.g. the rejection of slavery) as evidence that such absolutes can be discovered through reason. Further, if there are no moral absolutes, on what grounds can we conclude (as we often do) that individuals have made a significant moral improvement? Some will argue that moral relativism is not an ethical theory at all since it lacks normative force; and if it is not concerned with deciding how things <i>ought</i> to be, then the theory amounts to nothing more than personal preference. Sartre’s ethical subjectivism might be discussed in this light.</p> <p>Accept all relevant approaches to the question, and mark solely in accordance with the generic Levels of Response.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
3	<p><b>Critically examine the belief that scripture is authoritative for believers.</b></p> <p>Questions concerning scriptural authority are often grounded in the debate about scriptural inspiration. In the New Testament, 2 Timothy 3:16 declares that ‘All scripture is inspired by God and is useful for teaching, for reproof, for correction, and for training in righteousness.’ The word for ‘inspired’ here is the Greek <i>theopneustos</i> – ‘God-breathed’, and this is sometimes taken to mean that God dictated the books of scripture, their human authors being in effect dictating machines. In turn, this could be taken to mean that scripture is inerrant, in which case it must be authoritative for those who believe scripture to be true.</p> <p>For others, however, belief in scripture’s authority depends on the nature of that authority. Some believe that the New Testament is authoritative but the Old Testament is not, because (for example) its creation narratives in Genesis are a re-presentation of older Babylonian myths. The Old Testament might be seen as authoritative only in the sense of saying something about God’s nature as the creator: for example that God is powerful and loving, these characteristics being developed in the New Testament.</p> <p>There are many possible lines of approach, so do not expect uniformity in this respect. Some might, for example, contrast the Protestant doctrine of <i>Sola Scriptura</i> (by scripture alone) with the Catholic approach based on the Apostolic Succession and the Apostolic Tradition. The effects of the Protestant approach are seen in the work of Luther, who was concerned that humans should not pass judgement on God’s inspired word: without scripture there would be no Church, so the Church cannot be the judge of scripture, which is the supreme authority for believers. The Catholic Church sees the inspirational work of the Holy Spirit as ongoing in the life of the Church and the successors of the authority vested in Peter, the Popes and the Magisterium of the Church which is empowered to interpret Scripture. Clearly these hold that scripture has great authority for believers, but there are many different models of inspiration which affect the issue of authority. Candidates might discuss some of these. For example, the ‘neo-orthodoxy’ of scholars such as Karl Barth and Paul Tillich, for whom scripture’s inspiration is seen in God’s personal self-disclosure, and its authority relates to how the individual encounters and reacts to God. For Barth, Scripture is inspired by God but written by humans; it is not the word of God, but it <i>contains</i> the word of God. Precisely how far this takes us is difficult to fathom: given the great variety of literary types in the Bible, for example, these range from riddles and proverbs to prophecies and erotic poetry, which still leaves us with the problem of deciding how these have authority for believers, e.g. literal, symbolic, mythological, etc.</p> <p>Some might consider the authority of scripture for believers whose faith results from a religious experience, where the authority of the experience could lead the believer to accept the authority of scripture, or else to rely on a personal understanding of scripture deriving from the experience. Some might conclude that the authority of scripture over matters relating to salvation is paramount, whereas the power of reason might have greater authority than scripture in ethical matters.</p> <p>Accept all relevant approaches to the question, and mark solely in accordance with the generic Levels of Response.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
4	<p><b>‘There is no satisfactory definition of the conscience.’ Assess this claim.</b></p> <p>On one level, the work of definition is central to analysis of the conscience, and candidates will illustrate this by looking at the variety of definitions offered by different authorities. Religious definitions of the conscience for the most part relate it to God, so for Augustine, conscience is the innate voice of God, put into the mind by God and thus equivalent to an innate knowledge of right and wrong. This might be seen as unsatisfactory from both a religious and a secular point of view. It seems to make ethical discussion redundant, whereas for most people the essence of morally good behaviour is <i>voluntary</i> obedience to moral laws. Moreover if conscience is the voice of God, then the amount of evil in the world suggests that God’s voice is ineffective. Aquinas defines conscience as the God-given voice of reason governed by the synderesis rule that good should be done and evil avoided, although conscience can err by faulty understanding or faulty application of synderesis. The appeal to reason might be seen as satisfactory, but for Aquinas our understanding of morality includes the understanding that God exists: an argument which reaches a stone wall erected by those who have no such understanding. Some will refer to Bishop Butler’s understanding of conscience as a God-given principle that acts as an autonomous judge – a reflective principle placed within us by God. Butler seems not to have considered the possibility that conscience directs some towards evil, which puts a question mark over its supposed origin.</p> <p>More recent analysis places greater emphasis on the conscience as a social and/or psychological phenomenon. Freud’s analysis follows from his understanding of the mind: the super-ego is the controlling/restraining self which curbs the excesses of the <i>eros</i> and <i>thanatos</i> instincts. The super-ego is the repository of parental and other authoritarian influences, so it judges and threatens punishment, the feeling of threat being the conscience. To go against the super-ego brings about feelings of guilt, anxiety and remorse. Conscience has nothing to do with any God, and little or nothing to do with a desire to do what is morally right: it is just the internalisation of the wishes of our parents and other authority figures. For some this is satisfactory in that it gives an entirely secular account of conscience. For others Freud’s analysis is deeply unsatisfactory since it divorces conscience from any desire to do what is morally right for its own sake.</p> <p>Some might refer to a variety of other accounts of the conscience, such as Kohlberg’s view that conscience develops through social interaction, and that of Durkheim, that conscience is social conditioning brought to bear on the individual by the group. Accounts such as these offer satisfactory definitions of the conscience because they have good explanatory power: groups improve their survivability by compelling/conditioning individuals to subscribe to group morality and social obedience. Moreover their definitional power is satisfactory because the definition can include religion/God: God is worshipped as a being whose characteristics of omnipotence (etc.) compel obedience to society’s rules, those in turn being encoded in scriptures which are believed to bring blessings when obeyed and curses when broken.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
4	<p>Some might argue that a satisfactory definition of the conscience would have to include a multiplicity of features, for example: a recognition of: the nature of human psychology; the requirements for a stable society; the possibility for the conscience to criticise society where its norms become destabilising (e.g. by a propensity towards excessive violence); and the ability to have social and religious elements for those to whom such elements are important.</p> <p><b>Note</b> that although the Specification refers to religious understandings of the conscience (Augustine and Aquinas) and to psychological understandings (Butler &amp; Freud), candidates are not required to refer exclusively to these: any valid examples are acceptable.</p> <p>Accept all relevant approaches to the question, and mark solely in accordance with the generic Levels of Response.</p>	